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LONG LIVE LIFE SETTLEMENTS: THE
CURRENT STATUS AND PROPOSED
DIRECTION OF THE LIFE SETTLEMENT
MARKET
The payment of life insurance policy benefits to the insured’s suriving
spouse or child is something with which most people are both familiar
and comfortable. However, when those benefits are instead paid to a
third party investor who has no interest in the insured’s life, some people
cry foul. Yet this is the basic premise of the secondary market for life
insurance. In this market, insured individuals assign their policy benefits
to an investor who agrees to pay the insured a lump sum of money in
addition to assuming responsibility for the policy’s premiums.
While the underlying concepts that support the secondary market for
life insurance policies are not new, the young and imperfectly regulated
market has been strained by an increase in supply and demand for these
products. Because of the limited guidance within the market, fraud and
uncertainty have pervaded many transactions. As a result, many validly
settled policies may face challenges in the courts.
In an effort to help stabilize and legitimize the secondary market, this
Comment recommends coupling a strict judicial interpretation of the
incontestability periods contained in many life insurance policies with a
five year holding period on newly issued life insurance policies. This
framework will help deter fraudulent transactions while promoting
certainty among investors.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Most Americans have some familiarity with life insurance policies.
Countless beneficiaries have relied on the critical safety net that a life
insurance policy provides to guide their families through not only the
loss of a loved one but also the loss of the family’s breadwinner. To
illustrate, a recently married couple expecting its first baby may consider
purchasing life insurance policies. These policies will help ensure that,
even if something tragic occurs to one parent, the surviving family
members will be left with some support.
If, however, the family is able to avoid tragedy, the parents may at
some point in the future be left with a policy into which they no longer
wish to pay premiums. Until relatively recently, most owners of
2
unwanted life insurance policies had two options. First, the owner
3
could stop paying premiums and simply allow the policy to lapse.
Second, the policy owner could cancel the policy and recover any cash
4
surrender value that exists on the policy.
5
Policy owners now have a third option: a life settlement. In its most
basic form, a life settlement is a transaction where the policy owner sells
the policy to a third party for an amount greater than the policy’s cash
surrender value but less than the expected payout to the beneficiary
6
upon the policy owner’s death. Therefore, a life settlement creates a
secondary market that exploits an inefficiency to achieve a mutual
economic benefit. On one hand, a policy owner with an unwanted
policy can get more than the policy’s cash surrender value; on the other
7
hand, a third party can make a sizable gain.
1. Leslie Scism, More Go Without Life Insurance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at C1
(stating that only one-third of U.S. households do not have some form of life insurance).
2. PAUL J. WINN, VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS: THE LIFE INSURANCE
SECONDARY MARKET 1 (2008–2010).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part II.
6. STAFF REP. TO U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE 3
(2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. The payment will vary depending on a variety of factors.
See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. A study by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office found that individuals who settle a life insurance policy on the
secondary market receive nearly eight times the cash settlement value. See Press Release,
Life Settlement Institute, GAO Study Finds that Life Settlements Deliver Almost 8 times
Surrender Value to Seniors (July 28, 2010), available at http://lifesettlementinstitute.org/articl
es/article16.html.
7. See generally Michael K. Stanley, Boomers Ready for Life Settlement Option,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/01/26/boomers-ready-
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This Comment provides an effective approach to promote the
development of both an efficient and legal secondary marketplace for
life insurance policies. Specifically, this Comment will discuss how to rid
the life settlement market of stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI)
policies so that legitimate and beneficial life settlements between
competent parties can occur in an environment free of fraud and legal
8
Such an effort cannot be accomplished without an
uncertainty.
understanding of the life settlement market and the areas of law that are
relevant to that market.
To provide this background, Part II of this Comment will discuss the
life settlement industry in greater detail, beginning with a review of
participants on both the sell side and the buy side as well as the process
by which a life insurance policy progresses through the secondary
market. Part II also includes an examination of the relationship
between the primary insurance market and the secondary market.
Part III examines the case law that is relevant to the examination of
the life settlement market. The analysis begins with the case law
surrounding STOLI policies and provides insight into the concerns that
courts have raised regarding STOLI policies. The analysis then moves
into life settlements by examining some of the important cases that
serve as the foundation for the life settlement market. After laying this
foundation, the discussion advances into the current legal atmosphere in
Delaware, with special emphasis placed on two recent Delaware
Supreme Court cases. These Delaware cases are then contrasted with
the view taken by New York courts. An examination of proposals by
members of the insurance industry to establish a legitimate secondary
market follows the judicial analysis. This discussion focuses mostly on
the model acts proposed by two industry groups: the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the National
Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL).
Part IV applies the different holdings and regulatory proposals to
the secondary marketplace and determines that the New York rule
for-life-settlement-option; Deidre Wengen, More Boomers Selling Life Insurance Plans
to Fund Retirement, PHILLYBURBS.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.phillyburbs.com/lifestyle/
young_heart/more-boomers-selling-life-insurance-plans-to-fund-retirement/article_d9dd46764784-11e1-98eb-0019bb30f31a.html.
8. See Mary Ann Mancini & Caitlin L. Murphy, The Elusive Insurable Interest
Requirement: Are You Sure the Insured Is Insured?, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 409, 441–
43 (2012) (providing an overview of the concerns arising out of the increasing prevalence of
STOLI transactions).
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helps provides a more desirable, market-driven outcome.
The
discussion then advances by articulating the benefits of coupling the
New York view on incontestability clauses with state adoption of a fiveyear period where an insured, subject to certain “life events,” is barred
from assigning a policy to a third party. This approach would help rid
STOLI policies from the secondary market and bring with it the
certainty and legitimacy that the market desperately needs. Finally, Part
V offers a brief summary of this Comment’s discussion.
II. LIFE SETTLEMENTS IN CONTEXT
A. How Life Settlements Fit into the Broader Insurance Market
The life insurance industry in the United States is massive. Nearly
$2.9 trillion worth of new life insurance coverage was purchased in
9
2011. The total amount of life insurance in force totaled $19.2 trillion,
10
Of the $19.2 trillion total,
representing a 4% increase from 2010.
11
individual life insurance coverage contributed nearly $11 trillion. The
industry has an enormous impact on employment as well, with 807.9
million people employed by life, health, and medical insurance
12
companies in 2012. To provide some context, all components of the
insurance industry, including agencies and brokerages, employed 2.3
13
billion people.
Beyond just life insurance, the broader insurance market is
composed of several different categories that are in turn comprised of a
variety of sub-categories. To illustrate the difference between two
14
major kinds of insurance —property/casualty and life/health
insurance—imagine a car crash involving Alex, a fully insured person.
The damage to Alex’s car and any other property would be covered by

9. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2012, at 63 (2012).
10. Id.
11. Id. The secondary market for individual life insurance policies is the focus of this
Comment.
12. Careers and Employment, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts_statistics/careersand-employment.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
13. Id.
14. Not discussed here or elsewhere in this Comment are various public insurance
programs, like Medicare and Medicaid. Furthermore, this Comment does not incorporate a
discussion of group or commercial insurance. For a discussion on these subjects, see 1
STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 1:2 (rev. ed. 2009). Instead, this
Comment focuses on the secondary market for individual, personal life insurance. See infra
notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
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15

his property and casualty insurance. Any injuries sustained by Alex
16
during the accident would be covered by his health insurance. If Alex
died during the car accident, his beneficiaries would receive the
17
proceeds of his life insurance policy.
Because life settlements develop from life insurance policies, further
understanding of the kinds of life insurance is important. For the
purposes of this Comment, three basic kinds of life insurance: term,
18
endowment, and ordinary.
19
Term life insurance provides coverage for a specific term of time.
Premiums paid typically increase with the policyholder’s age, and if the
policyholder survives past the policy’s term, the premiums paid are
20
irretrievable.
Endowment life insurance strikes a balance between term life
21
insurance and a savings account. Under this arrangement, a term of
22
years is selected and periodic premium payments are made. If the
policyholder dies before the term’s completion, the beneficiary receives
23
the policy’s face value. Should the policyholder survive until the end of
the term, however, the policyholder would receive the policy’s face
15. See What is Property/Casualty Insurance?, ISO, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISOServices-for-Property-Casualty-Insurance/What-Is-Property/Casualty-Insurance.html
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2013) (defining property/casualty insurance as “insurance on homes, cars, and
businesses”).
16. See 1 BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE § 1.01 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012) (defining health insurance as “a broad
panoply of coverages for payments on account of accident, sickness, hospitalization, and
disability”).
17. See id. § 1.03. Though referred to as being under the same umbrella, life and health
insurance are typically memorialized in different policies. Id. § 1.01.
18. See id. § 1.03. The treatise refers to four basic types of life insurance, but because
limited payment life insurance is a type of whole-life insurance, there are, for the purposes of
this Comment, only three.
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1010–11 (9th ed. 2009); see also HARNETT & LESNICK,
supra note 16, § 1.03 (“Term insurance . . . covers death during a limited term of years.”)
20. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, § 1.03 (“[I]n term life insurance the insured’s
economic rights are exhausted and the premiums irretrievably paid out unless the insured dies
during the policy term.”); Increasing Term Life Insurance—Useful for Some,
LIFEINSURANCEHUB.NET, http://www.lifeinsurancehub.net/increasingpremiumtermlifeinsura
nce.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
21. Amy Fontinelle, The Pros of an Endowment Life Insurance Policy, YAHOO! FIN.
(Jul.
19,
2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/pros-endowment-life-insurance-policy213847789.html; see also HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03 (“Endowment forms
mark the transition from death protection to retirement protection.”).
22. Fontinelle, supra note 21.
23. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03; Fontinelle, supra note 21.
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24

value. These policies are common components in a college-savings
25
plan that a parent establishes for a child.
26
Whole-life insurance policies are ordinary life insurance policies.
As opposed to a term life policy, a whole-life policy covers the insured
until death and couples life insurance with a cash value account and
27
In exchange, the policyholder makes premium
annual dividend.
28
29
payments during his entire lifetime. Limited payment life insurance
policies offer a variation of whole-life policies by compressing premium
30
Under a limited
payments into an abbreviated payment window.
payment life insurance policy, an insured may pay all premiums, for
31
example, in one lump sum.
32
Furthermore, whole-life policies possess a cash surrender value,
which is defined as “[t]he amount of money payable when an insurance
policy having cash value, such as a whole-life policy, is redeemed before
33
maturity or death.”
Surrendering the policy offers a way for the
policyholder to cancel the policy while recovering a portion of the total
34
premiums paid to the insurance company. Furthermore, most insurers
impose a surrender charge that further erodes the discounted rate
24. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03. For example,
[I]n a $125,000 endowment policy, taken out at age thirty-five and payable at age
sixty-five, the insured, if still alive at sixty-five, gets his $125,000 as endowment
proceeds and the policy terminates. On the other hand, if the insured had died at
age forty-three, for instance, his beneficiary would have collected the $125,000 face
amount as death benefit proceeds.
Id.
25. See Fontinelle, supra note 21.
26. Howard J. Saks, Flexibility and Tax Advantages of Whole Life Insurance Are
Valuable Features, EST. PLAN., Nov. 2009, at 23; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1010
(9th ed. 2009) (defining ordinary life insurance as “[l]ife insurance having an investmentsensitive cash value, such as a whole life insurance or universal life insurance”); id. at 1011
(defining whole life insurance). But cf. id. at 873 (defining group insurance); id. at 1010
(defining industrial life insurance). For additional information, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
27. Leslie Scism, Life Policies: The Whole Truth, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2012, at B8.
28. These payments, along with broker costs, are often much higher for whole-life
insurance than term life insurance. See id.
29. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1011 (defining whole life insurance).
30. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1691 (9th ed. 2009).
34. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, § 1.03; PLITT ET AL., supra note 14, § 32:83.
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35

received by the policyholder. Because of the relatively paltry cash
surrender value, likely imposition of a surrender charge, and the
potential tax implications associated with surrendering a policy, the
eventual sum received will be minimal. As a result, a window of mutual
economic benefit exists for a policyholder and investor between the final
cash settlement value of the policy and the face value of the policy.
So what does this mean to someone looking to settle a life insurance
policy? Assume that Alex, our car accident victim from earlier, survives
the car crash but several years later is diagnosed with a rare and
aggressive form of leukemia. Alex carries two life insurance policies,
one valued at $1.5 million and the other valued at $1 million. An
experimental treatment exists for his leukemia, but due to its
experimental nature, Alex’s health insurance does not cover the
36
treatment. Willing to try anything to beat the leukemia, Alex talks to
his wife (the policy’s listed beneficiary) and they decide to dispose of
one policy to get the cash needed to afford the experimental treatment.
Unfortunately, neither of Alex’s policies have a cash surrender value
that is high enough to pay for the treatment. Wary of surrendering both
policies for a treatment that is not guaranteed to work, Alex enters the
life settlement market to find an investor who will pay more than the
cash surrender value of his policy but less than the policy’s benefits.
B. The Life Settlement Participants and Process
The underlying concept of the life insurance secondary market is
37
simple: transfer a policy from the owner to an investor. The secondary
35. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, at § 1.03. Surrender charges are not, in
themselves, “void as an unreasonable penalty, [or] against public policy.” Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 129 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1942). Some states, however, statutorily
cap the percentage that insurance companies can charge through surrender charges. See, e.g.,
N.Y. INS. LAW § 4220(a)(2)(B) (Consol. 2000) (fixing the limit on a surrender charge at two
and a half percent of the policy’s face value).
36. See Matt Stroud, U.S. Consumers Tell Insurers to Cover Experimental Drugs,
REUTERS
(Jan.
23,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-drugsidUSTRE80M16520120123 (recounting a case where an insurer would not pay for the
insured’s experimental treatment).
37. The earlier described circumstance regarding the need for liquidity to treat a disease
is only one of many potential reasons for seeking to settle a policy. See Sam Rosenfeld,
Life Settlements: Signposts to a Principal Asset Class 11–12 (Univ. of Pa. Wharton
Sch.
Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 09–20, 2009), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0920.pdf (other possibilities for settling a policy
include the policy no longer being necessary and the premiums becoming unaffordable);
A.M. BEST CO., CRITERIA—INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES 1 (2012), available at

12 KOUTNIK (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/13/2013 5:11 PM

LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET

921

life insurance market has been analogized to the real estate market
38
39
where, though direct sales from seller to buyer sometimes occur, the
process more commonly involves intermediaries serving as a conduit
40
between the seller and buyer. In the secondary life insurance market,
the common intermediaries include life settlement agents and brokers,
41
life settlement providers, and life expectancy underwriters.
1. The Sell Side
Policy owners will often be represented by a broker or an agent (and
in some instances both) who will help the owner navigate the secondary
42
insurance market. Because of the cloudy, and sometimes conflicting,
43
regulations in the life settlement industry, the definition of who can
44
serve as a broker may vary. For example, in states that regulate life
settlements, a licensed life insurance agent can act as a life settlement
45
broker, but financial planners, accountants, and lawyers cannot.
One of the tasks for life settlement brokers and agents—who are
46
typically working for a fee or commission —is to help the policy owner
prepare the information necessary to sell a life insurance policy on the
47
secondary market and to find potential purchasers. The life settlement
application is an important piece in this puzzle. The application requires
http://www.ambest.com/debt/lifesettlement.pdf (listing reasons similar to Rosenfeld’s and
including the need for cash following a bankruptcy or to fund new annuities, life insurance, or
investments).
38. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-775, LIFE INSURANCE
SETTLEMENTS: REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES MAY POSE A NUMBER OF CHALLENGES
19–29 (2010) [hereinafter REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES] (providing an overview of the
life settlement broker’s role); Sachin Kohli, Comment, Pricing Death: Analyzing the
Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 279, 282 (2006); Glenn S. Daily, What Is a Reasonable Broker’s Commission?, GLENN S.
DAILY (June 28, 2006), http://www.glenndaily.com/wmpwrb5a.htm (relying on typical real
estate broker’s commission to offer advice on reasonable life settlement broker’s
commission).
39. See REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 26.
40. Id.; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7–8 (discussing the various market
intermediaries used).
41. See REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 26.
42. Id. at 28–29; Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 12.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 28.
45. Id.
46. The fee or commission is a negotiated term between the policy owner and the broker
or agent. Id. at 29.
47. Id. at 28–29.
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the compilation of information regarding the life insurance policy, the
policy owner, the insured’s primary physicians, and the insured’s
48
medical records for the past several years.
Critically, the agent or broker also serves as the policy owner’s
49
liaison to the buy side of the life settlement process. The agent or
50
broker reaches out to multiple life settlement providers in an effort to
51
find an ideal purchaser of the owner’s policy. The expertise of a broker
is especially valuable here, since the broker will have a better idea of
which life settlement providers have portfolios or demand for the type
52
of policy that the owner is looking to settle.
2. The Buy Side
Just as policy owners typically rely on brokers to help navigate the
secondary market for life insurance, investors and financial institutions
in the life settlement marketplace generally use life settlement providers
53
to locate and bid on attractive life insurance policies. The provider will
examine many factors that impact the size of the payout from the policy.
These concerns can range from the financial stability of the insurance
54
company that issued the policy, to the probability that the issuing
insurance company will challenge the validity of the policy following a
55
56
settlement, and, of course, to the size of the policy’s face value.
Additionally, the longer the settling individual lives, the more premiums
48. WINN, supra note 2, at 15–16; see also LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N, THE BASICS OF
LIFE SETTLEMENTS: AN EDUCATIONAL GUIDE FOR CONSUMERS (2012) (discussing the
application process).
49. See Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 12.
50. Id.; see A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 2.
51. See Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 12; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7 (“Once
the application materials are complete, the settlement broker will offer or ‘bid’ the contract to
a number of providers to obtain a range of provider offers.”).
52. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7 (“[T]he settlement broker in some instances may
be the same insurance agent who sold the policy to the policy owner. In other cases, a broker
may work with a variety of insurance agents or other financial professional to solicit interest
from policy owners.”).
53. See A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 2.
54. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8; see also WINN, supra note 2, at 19 (explaining that
the expected percentage of the policy’s death benefit offered as a settlement amount “would
generally be reduced if the insurer on the policy is lower rated”).
55. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8. Challenging the validity of the contract following a
settlement typically rests on a lack of insurable interest argument. Id.; see also infra Part III.
The lack of standardized regulation presents further opportunities for legal challenges to
what may be valid settlements. See infra Part III.
56. REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES, supra note 38, at 33.
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the investor will have to pay. These additional premiums further erode
the investor’s eventual payout and tie up capital. Therefore, given its
direct impact on the size of the payout, the individual’s life expectancy
serves as the most critical variable in valuing a life insurance policy on
57
the secondary market.
Life expectancy underwriters play a critical role in the life settlement
process by helping to ameliorate the possibility that an investor will be
58
required to pay more premiums than anticipated. To accomplish this
important task, underwriters gather information from multiple, and in
some cases specialized, sources. For example, underwriters will
generally solicit a physician to review the medical history of the policy
59
To ensure accuracy, the
owner and make a recommendation.
underwriter may employ another physician to review the first
60
physician’s recommendation.
Furthermore, when determining the life expectancy, underwriters
also use special methods that are less formulaic than what the life
insurance industry uses because the pool used in life insurance
underwriting is typically much younger and healthier than those in the
61
By using these techniques, life
secondary life insurance market.
settlement underwriters are able to compensate for diseases that move
faster in older populations and impairments that, given an individual’s
62
All of these
age, will not have time to become life threatening.
techniques are used to determine a mean life expectancy for the insured,
63
which allows providers to assign the policy its proper value.
Once the underwriter finishes its examination, the provider will
64
review the information and either reject the policy or make an offer. If

57. See A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 1 (“The higher the medical impairment of an
insured . . . the higher the price paid for the insurance policy.”).
58. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8.
59. Id. at 9.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 8 (“Different methodologies are used because life insurance underwriting is
generally limited to a younger population with limited medical impairments whereas life
expectancy underwriting is used with an older population who may have multiple significant
impairments.”).
62. See id. at 9 (listing three common adjustments to align the life insurance debit
methodology with the life settlement demographic).
63. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13. The multiple sources and techniques utilized also
result in estimates varying from provider to provider, making the broker’s task of generating
multiple bids an important one. See WINN, supra note 2, at 18.
64. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 9.
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the life expectancy of the policy owner is relatively short, the provider
will be willing to pay more for the policy for numerous reasons: the
number of premiums that the investor will have to pay is fewer, the
65
investor will receive payment sooner, and the risk is theoretically less.
As a result, a lower life expectancy results in a higher cash settlement,
which benefits each intermediary in the market.
3. Finalizing the Deal
If the insured accepts the provider’s offer, the insurer changes the
ownership of the policy and transfers it to an escrow agent who pays the
66
seller. Once the seller is paid, most states require a rescission period
67
whereby the seller can pull out of the deal. Upon completion of the
68
transfer, the investor takes control of the premium payments. To help
with this process, a specialized tracking agency ensures that the
individual who settled his policy is still alive before the payment of each
69
premium. Once the policy matures (that is, the individual who settled
70
the policy dies) the investor receives the benefit of the policy.
C. Development of the Secondary Life Insurance Market—Booms
The United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for the life
insurance secondary market over a century ago with its decision in
65. See WINN, supra note 2, at 19. For a life expectancy of less than six months, an
expected percentage of the policy’s death benefit offered as a bid may be around 80%. Id.
For a life expectancy of two years or greater, the expected bid drops to 50% of the policy’s
death benefit. Id.
66. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13.
67. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-715(5) (LexisNexis 2011) (“All life
settlement contracts entered into in this state shall contain an unconditional right to rescind a
life settlement contract before the earlier of thirty (30) calendar days after the date it is
executed or fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of receipt of the proceeds of the life
settlement contract by the owner.”); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7813(g)(1) (Consol. Supp. 2012)
(“Every life settlement contract shall provide that the owner has an unconditional right to
rescind the life settlement contract from the time of execution of the contract until fifteen
days after the receipt of the life settlement proceeds . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 632.69(8)(f) (2009–
2010) (“[T]he owner has a right to rescind a life settlement contract before the earlier of 30
calendar days after the date upon which the life settlement contract is executed by all parties
or 15 calendar days after the life settlement proceeds have been paid to the owner . . . .”).
68. See Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13.
69. Id.; see, e.g., Services, TRACK-LIFE, http://www.track-life.com/index.php (last visited
Mar. 25, 2013) (explaining that Track-Life “give[s] life settlement providers and other policy
owners an alternative means to manage” the effective tracking, managing, and monitoring of
a portfolio of policies).
70. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 13.
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71

Grigsby v. Russell. In Grigsby, a man named John Bruchard took out a
72
life insurance policy. In year three of his policy, while in desperate
73
need of money, Bruchard sold his life insurance policy to Grigsby. In
consideration of the deal, Grigsby purchased the policy for $100 and the
74
duty to pay the future premiums.
The Court discussed that Grigsby had no insurable interest in
Bruchard’s life, defining insurable interest as having “an interest in
having the life [of the insured] continue[,] and so one that is opposed to
75
crime.” The Court suggested that the holder of a valid life insurance
policy should be able to transfer the policy to “one whom [the insured],
76
the party most concerned, is not afraid to trust.” In other words, the
Court determined that a policyholder has the right to assign the policy
to whomever the policyholder so chooses and that an assignee does not
77
need to have an insurable interest in the assignor. Furthermore, the
78
Court categorized life insurance policies as property. By providing that
individuals can assign life insurance policies to third parties that do not
have an insurable interest in the insured, and by categorizing life
insurance policies as property, the Supreme Court provided important
principles to the future life settlement market.
The Grigsby decision paved the way for the development of the
79
viatical settlement market during the AIDS crisis in the 1980s. Viatical
71. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
72. Id. at 154.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 155.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 157. One of the first instances of the court addressing the assignment of a
life insurance policy occurred in Warnock v. Davis. 104 U.S. 775 (1881). Warnock involved
the assignment of a life insurance policy to an individual with no insurable interest who
agreed to pay the premiums. See id. at 779. The Court considered this agreement to be a
wager policy and held it invalid. Id. Importantly, the Court went even further and stated that
“[t]he assignment of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as objectionable as
the taking out of a policy in his name.” Id. Grigsby back-tracked on the Warnock decision
and added to the foundation for the eventual creation of the life settlement market. See
Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 157. For a more thorough discussion and context on these cases, see
supra Part III.A.1.
78. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156.
79. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Betting on the Lives of Strangers: Life Settlements,
STOLI, and Securitization, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 173, 174 (2010); Eli Martin Lazarus, Note,
Viatical and Life Settlement Securitization: Risks and Proposed Regulation, 29 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2010); see also NIH Researchers Recall the Early Years of AIDS, NAT’L
INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/NIHInOwnWords/docs/page_26.html (last visited
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settlements target policy owners who are terminally ill—usually defined
80
as having a life expectancy less than two years. When an individual is
terminally ill, future costs are limited and the “risk-adjusted value of the
81
death benefit” greatly exceeds a policy’s surrender value. Shortly after
its discovery, the AIDS mortality rate for identified cases was
approximately ninety-three percent in 1981 and eighty-nine percent in
82
1982. AIDS patients required money for the high cost of treatment
and—given high mortality rates—investors saw an opportunity to make
money by providing a portion of the patient’s life insurance benefit in
83
exchange for becoming the policy’s beneficiary. However, because the
medical community began to make strides in the treatment of
84
HIV/AIDS, extending the lives of those infected with the HIV virus,
the secondary life insurance market shifted its focus to other terminal
85
diseases, like cancer and Lou Gehrig’s disease.
The secondary market then began to develop in another direction,
shifting its focus beyond only individuals with terminal illness to senior
86
This second type of policy
citizens with non-terminable diseases.
owner falls under the life settlement category. These policies are owned
by seniors between sixty and eighty years old who have stable spouses
87
and children and large annual insurance premiums. In turn, a third
market, this time fraudulent, grew from the life settlement market: the
88
STOLI policy market. This market sought senior citizens who would
take out a life insurance policy with the intent to then sell that policy on
89
the secondary market.
In terms of value, the life insurance secondary market has grown
significantly from its modest viatical settlement roots. In 1989, an

Mar. 25, 2013).
80. A.M. BEST CO., supra note 37, at 1.
81. Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life
Insurance Policies 2 (Univ. of Pa. Wharton Sch. Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 02–41,
2002), available at http://www.carnegieassociatesltd.com/articles/Wharton.pdf.
82. WINN, supra note 2, at 4.
83. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 3.
84. See Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic 2011, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/hiv/data/2012_epi_core_en.png (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
85. Martin, supra note 79, at 185–86.
86. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4; WINN, supra note 2, at 5.
87. WINN, supra note 2, at 5; Martin, supra note 79, at 186.
88. See Mancini & Murphy, supra note 8, at 438–39.
89. Id. at 439; Martin, supra note 79, at 186.
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estimated $5 million in life insurance policies were settled. By 1998,
91
that number rose to $200 million. This high rate of growth continued
until the 2008 financial crisis: in 2005 the value of settled policies jumped
92
to about $10 billion before peaking in 2007 at about $12 billion.
Both investors and Wall Street were excited about the growth in the
93
young market. Research firm Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. predicted in
2007 that the face value of life settlement deals would exceed $160
94
billion. The insurance industry research firm Conning Research and
Consulting estimated that by 2016 the face value of life insurance
policies settled in the secondary market would be between $90 and $140
95
billion.
These high expectations were based on several factors, not the least
being that the deals provide a payment upon an event that is certain to
96
happen. In the investment world, such certainty can be hard to find.
Given such certainty, if investment banks could effectively securitize life
settlements, the detrimental effect of individuals who survive past their
life expectancy would be offset by other individuals in the “portfolio”
who die sooner than anticipated. This arrangement made consistent and
97
significant returns seem within reach. Generally, life settlement assets
were projected to return between nine percent and thirteen percent to
98
investors.
The fact that these returns are known as “uncorrelated returns”
offers a second benefit. An uncorrelated asset generates returns
99
independently of the market. That is to say, even if the market is
plunging, people are still going to die. Therefore, it was believed that

90. Martin, supra note 79, at 186.
91. Id.
92. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4; Matthew Goldstein, Profiting from Mortality,
BUSINESSWEEK, July 30, 2007, at 44, 46.
93. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46.
94. Id.
95. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4.
96. Everyone dies. The only uncertainty is when the person will die and, in turn, when
the investor will get paid. The same cannot be said about the direction of a particular stock or
bond.
97. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 48.
98. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 11. Such returns are especially attractive since from
1926 to 1998 the realized—that is, actual—rate of return on equities was 5.2%. Peter A.
Diamond, What Stock Market Returns to Expect for the Future?, 63 SOC. SECURITY BULL.,
no. 2 2000, at 38, 38.
99. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46.
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institutional investors would find securitized life settlement products
especially attractive, perhaps serving as a way to hedge riskier bets made
100
elsewhere by the firm. This hedging ability is an intrinsic benefit that
life settlement assets offer to investors that does not appear in the
expected rate of return.
Yet another consideration that went into the expected growth of the
life settlement market was the changing demographic makeup of the
101
In just ten years, from 2010 to 2020, the number of
United States.
Americans sixty-five years of age and over is expected to grow by thirty102
six percent, from about forty million to about fifty-five million.
Similarly, and likely of more interest to the life settlement market, the
number of people aged eighty-five and over is expected to increase by
103
about fifteen percent from 2010 to 2020. The ranks of the elderly will
104
soon begin to swell in the United States. It seems that there will be
many opportunities for life settlements in the future, making the
development of a stable and legitimate marketplace especially
important.
D. Development of the Secondary Life Insurance Market—Busts
Despite these benefits, the life settlement market’s rate of growth
105
In 2008, with the
has fallen short of some Wall Street expectations.
market continuing its upward trend, the life settlement market was
106
estimated at $15 billion.
Then, in 2009, the market plunged to an
107
estimated $7 billion of settled policies. At the same time, some of the
major banks that had entered the life settlement market—including
108
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank—began to pull back.
100. Id.; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 11.
101. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 50.
102. See Projected Future Growth of the Older Population, ADMIN. ON AGING,
http://www.aoa.gov/AoARoot/Aging_Statistics/future_growth/future_growth.aspx
(last
updated June 23, 2010).
103. Id.
104. See Bill Glauber, 65-and-Older Numbers Jump 10%, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Dec. 1, 2011, at 5B (stating that, nationally, the number of Americans 65 and older increased
by 5.3 million from 2000 to 2010 and that older populations grew faster than the general
population).
105. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46 (explaining Wall Street’s hope of “turning most
of the life settlements created each year into death bonds”).
106. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4.
107. Id.
108. Matthew Goldstein, Deutsche Kicks the Grim Reaper, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 30,
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/investing/wall_street_news_blog/archives/2009/01/deutsc
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Such a pullback was not completely unforeseen given the economic
109
and credit conditions of 2009. Along with the loss of confidence in the
110
financial system came a lockup in financing and liquidity. Thus, assets
that require significant payment of capital up-front—like life insurance
policies, which usually have premiums around five to ten percent of face
111
value per year —and take several years to pay off were not particularly
attractive to investors in an environment where capital was extremely
112
difficult to secure.
While a lack of liquidity certainly contributed to the industry’s
malaise, the more damning issue seems to be the inherent negative
connotation associated with an investor profiting from the death of a
disinterested third party, especially when this result is achieved in a
113
Because the market is not as well regulated as the
fraudulent way.
insurance and securities markets, brokers have an easier time altering,
or lying about, expected costs and returns to make the products appear
114
more appealing.
To illustrate, consider the case of Curtis Somoza and Robert
115
Coberly. In 2004, these two California men orchestrated a $64 million
116
The men promised investors a
Ponzi scheme using life settlements.
25% return on a “sophisticated bond trading program[]” that involved
he_kicks.html; Darla Mercado, Goldman Sachs Abandoning Life Settlements Market,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100129/FREE/
100129850.
109. See Scott Lanman, Bernanke Warns of Credit Market ‘Relapse,’ BLOOMBERG
(May 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNX4ZbLkEXt
A (explaining that, although the credit market was showing signs of bottoming after a three
year decline, “unprecedented” efforts to boost credit by the Federal Reserve were likely to
continue); Ari Levy & Caroline Salas, Obama Becomes Banker–in–Chief in
Credit Market Freeze, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pi
d=newsarchive&sid=aBKDYyojIxfk (quoting Kenneth Rosen as stating that “[u]nfreezing
credit ‘is the single most important thing’” for then President–Elect Obama).
110. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
111. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Particularly, the advent of the STOLI market created a nuanced, but fraudulent,
version of a life settlement.
114. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 46.
115. Martin Zimmerman, Westlake Village Man Sentenced in $44-Million Ponzi Scheme,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/05/business/fi-ponzi5.
116. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Westlake Village Man Who
Orchestrated $64 Million Ponzi Scheme Sentenced to 25 Years in Federal Prison (Nov. 3,
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2009/128.html [hereinafter
FBI Press Release].
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purchasing $275,000 life insurance policies and paying premiums on
117
behalf of around 2,000 members of an inner Los Angeles church.
From there, the policy that was taken out on each individual would be
split in three parts upon the death of the covered individual: $15,000
would go to the deceased’s family, $20,000 would go to the church
group, and $240,000 to a trust that would be used to pay premiums and
118
pay investors. Investors liked what they heard because it was sold as a
119
“risk-free” investment opportunity that promised large returns.
The
pastor of the church group approved because both the members of his
120
group and the organization itself would benefit. Somoza and Coberly
especially liked the scheme because the investors’ money went right into
their pockets and allowed the two to live out what the sentencing judge
121
deemed “an orgy of self-indulgence.” On his own, Somoza spent $27
122
million in sixteen months.
However, as some investors began
requesting their money, Somoza and Coberly could only return about
123
$28 million before the scheme fell apart.
Somoza and Coberly are hardly the only individuals to conduct
questionable, and in many instances illegal, practices in the life
124
settlement market. As the director of enforcement for the Texas State
Securities Board stated, an “absolutely unreal” amount of fraud exists in
125
Thus, Somoza and Coberly’s scheme is
the life settlement arena.
illustrative of numerous problems that have plagued the young market.
These men took advantage of a regulatory hole by claiming that the
126
investment was “risk-free” and by offering 25% percent returns.
Additionally, there is an especially wide information gap between

117. Id.; Goldstein, supra note 92, at 49.
118. See FBI Press Release, supra note 116.
119. See id.
120. See Goldstein, supra note 92, at 49.
121. FBI Press Release, supra note 116.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Leslie Scism, Regulators Crack Down on Murky Life-Insurance Policies,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2010, at D1 (providing the example of Steven Brasner, a Florida
insurance sales agent who arranged STOLI transactions for hedge funds and inserted false
wealth and other information on the insurance application).
125. Rob Curran, The Pros and Cons of Betting on Death, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2010, at
R7.
126. FBI Press Release, supra note 116. Industry groups have addressed some of these
problems by, for example, proposing regulation on advertising that would eliminate the use of
words like “free” or “no cost” insurance. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
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127

investors and brokers.
Investors cannot know whether the claims
made by doctors and actuaries about the life expectancy of the insured
are legitimate or whether they have been skewed so that the broker can
128
earn larger commissions.
129
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, each party in the chain has the
incentive to depress the life expectancy of the individual so that the deal
is larger and a larger commission may be earned. It follows that, if the
life expectancy is artificially low, the projected return on the investment
will be artificially high, and investors will not realize the returns
expected or promised. These unrealized expectations can lead to
investors pulling cash from the investments and causing major problems
130
because of the high liquidity requirements of these investments.
E. The Impact of the Secondary Life Insurance Market on the Primary
Life Insurance Market
The secondary life insurance market may be beneficial to some
individuals who wish to sell their policy, but does the presence of a
secondary market negatively impact the primary market? The answer
to this question, of course, depends on who is asked.
Some argue that life settlements will drive up the cost of insurance in
the primary market and affect the profitability and financial condition of
131
the insurers.
As mentioned earlier, prior to life settlements policy
owners who no longer wanted to own their policy could either let the
132
policy lapse or accept the cash surrender value. Based on experience
and industry studies, insurers build assumptions regarding lapse rates
133
into their pricing models.
If the actual lapse rate falls short of the
127. See Curran, supra note 125.
128. See id. (stating that investors cannot independently verify assertions that doctors
and actuaries make, a problem that is compounded by the market’s still developing regulatory
approaches).
129. See discussion supra Part II.B.
130. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
131. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19; Hanming Fang & Edward Kung, How Does Life
Settlement Affect the Primary Insurance Market? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15761, 2010) (stating that life insurance companies claim “that the life settlement
market, by denying them the return on lapsing or surrendered policies, increases the costs of
providing policies in the primary market”).
132. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19; see also Fang & Kung, supra note 131, at 2.
133. DELOITTE CONSULTING & THE UNIV. OF CONN., THE LIFE SETTLEMENTS
MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE 12 (2005)
[hereinafter ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE] (“Life insurance companies rely on their own lapse
experience and industry lapse studies when determining appropriate lapse assumptions.”);
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assumed rate, the insurer may run into financial difficulty because of the
134
inability to raise fixed premium payments on other policy owners.
Furthermore, insurers have relied on not having to pay some policies
due to termination or surrender, but a thriving life settlement market
could “significantly increase the average death claim incurred per
135
136
policy,” thereby eroding some of the insurer’s profits. The end result
would be insurance companies seeking to make up that lost profit, which
137
would likely result in higher costs for customers in the primary market.
On the other hand, industry observers informed the SEC Task Force
on Life Settlements that “the extent of [the secondary market’s] impact
138
is likely to be small.” While the secondary market offers a mutually
beneficial economic opportunity between a policy owner and investors
139
that the insurance companies do not provide, growth estimates project
the market to, perhaps generously, achieve a size of between $90 and
140
In contrast, in 2011 the total life insurance in
$140 billion by 2016.
141
force in the United States was worth $19.2 trillion. In early 2010, only
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 19–20 (“Life insurers typically base assumed lapse rates on
experience.”).
134. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 20; see also ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note
133, at 12 (“Ultimately, these pricing assumptions determine the sources of profit and longterm viability of the life insurance company.”).
135. Press Release, Conning Research & Consulting, Life Settlements—The Market
Stabilizes
as
Insurer
Impact
Grows
(Nov.
1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.conning.com/pressrelease-detail.aspx?id=5152 [hereinafter Conning].
136. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 50; see also Fang & Kung, supra note 131, at 2. The
premiums paid in the early years of a fixed premium long-term health insurance policy exceed
what is actuarially fair. Id. Known as “front-loading,” the insured secures premium payments
that are likely lower than what the insured would be able to acquire later in life. Fang &
Kung, supra note 131, at 2. As a result, over the course of the policy, the actuarial value
begins to balance out. Id. An insured that allows a policy to lapse or accepts the cash
settlement value allows the life insurance company to retain the front-loaded premiums
before the actuarial value has an opportunity to balance out. Id. By removing from the
market policies that would otherwise settle or lapse, the secondary market, in theory, harms
the primary insurance market. Id.
137. See Fang and Kung, supra note 131, at 2 (“[T]he life settlement market, by denying
[the insurance companies] the return on lapsing or surrendered policies, increases the costs of
providing policies in the primary market. They allege that these costs will have [to] be passed
on to consumers . . . .”).
138. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 20.
139. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 3. Some commentators have stated that the life
insurance industry “is well positioned to create a more efficient secondary market for
impaired policyholders . . . .” ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 133, at 2.
140. Rosenfeld, supra note 37, at 7.
141. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2012, at 66 tbl.7.1
(2012), available at http://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact%
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about 1% of all life insurance policies issued by that date were settled.
Nominally, it seems unlikely that a secondary market of this size will
143
meaningfully undercut the stability of the primary insurance market.
Furthermore, some commentators believe that the presence of an
efficient secondary life insurance market will ultimately be beneficial to
144
145
the primary market. For example, Neil A. Doherty and Hal J. Singer
argue that the secondary life insurance market makes the life insurance
policy a more liquid asset and, therefore, more valuable in the primary
146
Doherty and Singer liken the secondary market for life
market.
147
insurance to the secondary market for catastrophe risk insurance.
Both secondary markets strengthen their respective primary market by
assuring the consumer that selling the policy in the future will not result
148
This limit on downside risk led to higher
in a below market price.
sales of catastrophe risk in the primary market, and a similar outcome
149
Indeed,
should be expected in the life insurance primary market.
20Book/Documents/_factbook2012_entirety_020813.pdf (noting that the $19.2 trillion worth
of in force policies can be broken down into the following subtotals: individual, $10.99 trillion;
group, $7.83 trillion; credit, $111.8 billion).
142. Michael Shumrak, Life Settlements—A Window of Opportunity for the Life
Insurance Industry?, REINSURANCE NEWS, Feb. 2010, at 14, 16 (stating, despite the relatively
small size, that the “financial impact of life settlements on life insurer’s future earnings is
complex and probably not immaterial”).
143. See id. (noting that growth rates in new settlements suggests that the percentage of
policies settled “will not increase to a very large percentage”). But see Conning, supra note
135 (“The life settlements industry has generally targeted a small number of insurers’
universal life policies with higher face amounts . . . .”). While the percentage of policies
settled relative to the whole industry may be small, if those policies are targeted at a few
insurers the impact on those insurers could be more severe.
144. Neil A. Doherty is the Fredrick H. Ecker Professor of Insurance and Risk
Management and Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania. Business Economics and Policy Department, WHARTON,
https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1673/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
145. Hal J. Singer is the Managing Director and Principal at Navigant Economics.
Experts, NAVIGANT ECON., http://www.naviganteconomics.com/who/singer_pri.php (last
visited Mar. 25, 2013).
146. Doherty & Singer, supra note 81, at 7.
147. Id. at 15. The article also likens the life insurance secondary market to the
secondary market for mortgages. Id. Written in 2002, the article pre-dates the recent
financial crisis that was caused in part by the securitization of very risky home mortgages.
See Knowledge @Wharton, Securitization 2.0, FORBES.COM (Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.f
orbes.com/2008/04/03/credit-crisis-subprime-ent-fin-cx_kw_0403whartonsecuritize.html
(“[S]ecuritization of subprime real estate loans is blamed for the global liquidity crisis . . . .”);
see also discussion supra Part II.D.
148. Doherty & Singer, supra note 81, at 15.
149. Id.
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other studies have determined that the life insurance secondary market
will benefit both consumers and insurers by allowing consumers to
obtain higher prices for their policies, in turn strengthening demand for
150
the policies on the primary market.
III. JUDICIAL AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY EFFORTS REGARDING THE
SECONDARY LIFE INSURANCE MARKET
The current demand and expected growth of the secondary life
151
insurance market suggests that it is here to stay. Therefore, the best
option appears to be embracing the market while regulating it in a way
that prevents and eliminates fraud, but encourages lawful and beneficial
settlements. Indeed, by addressing and proscribing STOLI transactions,
this appears to be the approach adopted by courts, state legislatures, and
152
the life settlement industry.
A. Case Law—Examples from Delaware and New York
1. Delaware
American courts adopted the English common law view that a valid
153
life insurance policy requires an insurable interest. An 1876 Supreme
Court decision reflects this understanding by stating that “statutes to the
same effect [as those insurable interest statutes passed in England] have
been passed in some of the States; but where they have not been, in
most cases either the English statutes have been considered as
154
operative, or the older common law has been followed.” This decision
was followed shortly after by Warnock v. Davis, one of the earliest
155
examples of the attempted assignment of a life insurance policy. The

150. See, e.g., Nadine Gatzert et al., The Impact of the Secondary Market on Life
Insurers’ Surrender Profits, 76 J. RISK & INS. 887, 905–06 (2009) (pointing out that life
insurers would need to “abandon lapse-supported pricing”).
151. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text (regarding the size of the market
and the graying population).
152. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B.
153. Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A
Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 481 (2005). Before the eighteenth century,
there were no insurable interest laws in England and wagering contracts on the lives of others
were allowed (for example, whether an individual would ultimately be convicted and
executed of a capital offense). Id. In 1774, the British Parliament passed a statute requiring
an insurable interest. Id.
154. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).
155. See generally Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881).
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Warnock decision involved the assignment of a life insurance policy to
an individual with no insurable interest who agreed to pay the
156
premiums. The Court considered this agreement to be a wager policy
157
Importantly, the Court went even further and
and held it invalid.
stated that “[t]he assignment of a policy to a party not having an
insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his
158
name.”
The Court later backtracked on the Warnock wager comparison in
159
Grigsby v. Russell, a move that has since been judicially reinforced,
160
and in many instances codified. As these cases and statutes illustrate,
an insurable interest is always present when one takes out a life
161
insurance policy on one’s own life. As a result, in the secondary life
insurance market, insurable interest typically becomes a problem when
a third person attempts to procure a policy on an individual whom the

156. See id. at 778–79.
157. Id. at 779.
158. Id.
159. See supra Part II.C. Specifically, the Grigsby court’s suggestion that the holder of a
valid life insurance policy should be able to transfer the policy to “one whom [the insured],
the party most concerned, is not afraid to trust” indicates that the transferee’s insurable
interest in the transferor is irrelevant. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911).
160. See, e.g., Bajwa v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 776 N.E.2d 609, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(“[O]ne may insure his own life for the benefit of another having no insurable interest
therein.” (quoting Colgrove v. Lowe, 175 N.E. 569, 571 (Ill. 1931))); Estate of Bean v. Hazel,
972 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo. 1998) (“[A] person may purchase an insurance policy on his own
life and name as beneficiary a person who has no insurable interest in the person’s life
‘provided it not be done by way of cover for a wagering policy.’” (quoting Lakin v. Postal Life
& Cas. Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542, 552 (Mo. 1958))). For statutes, see for example, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18 § 2704(a) (1999) (“Any individual of competent legal capacity may procure or
effect an insurance contract upon his/her own life or body for the benefit of any person, but
no person shall procure or cause to be procured any insurance contract upon the life or body
of another individual unless the benefits under such contract are payable to the individual
insured or his/her personal representatives or to a person having, at the time when such
contract was made, an insurable interest in the individual insured.”) and N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3205(b) (Consol. 2000) (“(1) Any person of lawful age may on his own initiative procure or
effect a contract of insurance upon his own person for the benefit of any person, firm,
association or corporation. Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the immediate
transfer or assignment of a contract so procured and effectuated [and] (2) [n]o person shall
procure or cause to be procured, directly or by assignment or otherwise[,] any contract of
insurance upon the person of another unless the benefits under such contract are payable to
the person insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time when
such contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured.”).
161. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 16, § 2.04 (“[A] person has an insurable interest
in his own life, which means that he can insure his own life for the benefit of whomever he
chooses and to whatever amount the insurer will write.”).

12 KOUTNIK (DO NOT DELETE)

936

4/13/2013 5:11 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:913

purchaser has no insurable interest.
To illustrate, the 2011 Delaware case Sun Life Assurance Company
of Canada v. Berck illustrates a common challenge that STOLI policies
face in the courts: the lack of an insurable interest voiding the
162
incontestability clause.
In Berck, a group of investors assisted 77-year-old Daniel Berman in
applying for a life insurance policy with the intention of purchasing the
policy from Berman to sell to other investors on the life settlement
163
market.
On June 6, 2007, a $4 million policy was issued to Berman
164
with an incontestability clause that stated, in part, “In the absence of
fraud, after this Policy has been in force during the lifetime of the
Insured for a period of two years from its Issue Date, [the insurance
165
company] cannot contest it except for non-payment of Premiums.”
During the procurement of the policy, Berman indicated that the policy
was for an estate plan, and an attached Broker’s Report that was signed
166
Upon
by one of the investors corroborated Berman’s indication.
Berman’s death, the insurance company argued that the policy was void
167
168
ab initio because of a lack of insurable interest. The investors argued
that an insurable interest existed and that the incontestability clause
169
barred the insurance company from claiming the policy is invalid.
The court found that there was no insurable interest at the time of
170
the policy’s creation.
The court defined an insurable interest as
benefits payable to individuals related by blood, law, or “‘substantial
interest engendered by love and affection[]’ or [] other individuals with
‘a lawful and substantial economic interest’” in the continuing life of the

162. See Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733 (D. Del.
2011); see also PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Morello 2007 Irrevocable Trust, 645 F.3d 965, 967
(8th Cir. 2011); Ohio Nat’l Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis, No. 10C2386, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73197, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2011).
163. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
164. Id. at 730. Delaware requires two-year incontestability clauses in life insurance
contracts. Id. at 731. The Delaware statute reads in part: “There shall be a provision that the
policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a
period of not more than 2 years after its date of issue.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2908(a)
(1999).
165. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
166. Id.
167. Latin for “[f]rom the beginning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (9th ed. 2009).
168. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 733.
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171

insured.
As the court stated, the insurable interest requirement is
meant to prevent life insurance contracts from being used as wagering
contracts that give policyholders “‘a sinister counter interest in having
172
the life come to an end.’” It is precisely this concern that faces STOLI
policies. Furthermore, lack of insurable interest is an issue at the time
that the policy is acquired, and in this case the disinterested third parties
and their STOLI scheme presented no insurable interest in the Berman
173
policy.
Because there was no insurable interest, the court held that the
174
policy was void ab initio. The court pointed out that, with New York
as an exception, an insurable interest in the insured is required for
175
Furthermore, because
enforcement of a life insurance contract.
invoking an incontestability clause “presupposes a basically valid
contract[,]” the court held the incontestability clause to be
176
inapplicable. Since the policy was void from the beginning the court
held that the incontestability period did not prevent the insurance
177
company from challenging the policy. Finally, the “in the absence of
178
fraud” proviso contained in the incontestability clause appeared to be
179
the nail in the coffin for the investor’s argument.
Importantly, the court held that when an insured does not plan on
using the policy as a cover for a wager—a non-STOLI case—“it is well
established that . . . the beneficial interest may be legally transferred to
180
Clearly, then,
an individual or entity without an insurable interest.”
171. Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2704(c) (1999)). Though “insurable interest”
is “difficult to define with precision,” PLITT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 41.20, the Berck court’s
view accurately reflects the modern view of the insurable interest, see, e.g., id. at § 41:21
(noting that the majority of cases indicate that spouses and blood relatives usually have an
insurable interest, as do individuals with an affinity for the person).
172. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 733–34 (quoting Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154
(1911)); see also supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
173. See Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 733, 735.
174. Id. at 733. “The issue of whether a plaintiff is legally entitled to contest the validity
of an insurance contract on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation after the two-year
incontestability period is a matter of first impression in Delaware.” Id. at 732.
175. Id.; see also infra notes 209–31 and accompanying text (discussing the New York
rule).
176. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 732–33 (quoting Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550
A.2d 677, 689 (Md. 1988)).
177. Id. at 733.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 734.
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the court indicated a bright line between STOLI transactions and
viatical and life settlement transactions.
The position of Delaware is further developed in a pair of
September 2011 cases that involved intricate trust organizations trying
181
to evade STOLI prohibitions. In PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Dawe
2006 Insurance Trust, the insurance company, PHL, issued a $9 million
policy on the life of Price Dawe with the Price Dawe Trust as the
182
The policy had an incontestability
policy’s owner and beneficiary.
provision that activated after two years and was effective except against
183
fraud.
Three and a half years after the policy was issued, and
following Dawe’s death, PHL contested the policy, arguing that it was a
184
STOLI and was never intended for legitimate insurance needs.
The facts of Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Schlanger 2006
Insurance Trust are very similar to Dawe and include the insurance
company, Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, issuing a $6
million policy on Schlanger’s life with the Schlanger Trust as the
185
beneficiary. In both cases, the insurance companies argued that a trust
186
scheme was established to conceal STOLI transactions. Basically, the
scheme established an insurance trust, and the beneficiary of the
187
After the insurance policy was
insurance trust was a family trust.
issued to the insurance trust, the insured sold his interest in the family
188
trust to a third party who paid the premiums on the policy.
The Dawe court answered three certified questions, two of which are
applicable here, and the first being the same question certified in the
189
Lincoln case. The first certified question was whether Delaware law
181. See generally PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 (Del.
2011); Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 436 (Del. 2011).
182. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1063.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 437.
186. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1063–64; Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 438.
187. Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 438.
188. Id.
189. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1064; Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 438. The third certified question—
inapplicable to the scope of this Comment—asked whether Delaware law
“confer[s] upon the trustee of a Delaware trust established by an individual insured
an insurable interest in the life of that individual when, at the time of the application
for life insurance, the insured intends that the beneficial interest in the Delaware
trust would be transferred to a third-party investor with no insurable interest in that
individual’s life following the issuance of the life insurance policy[.]”
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permitted an insurer to challenge the validity of a life insurance interest
190
after the incontestability period had lapsed. The Delaware Supreme
Court held that the insurable interest requirement of a life insurance
191
policy may be challenged after the incontestability period had lapsed.
The court considered this decision to be “consistent with that reached
192
by the majority of courts.” The court reasoned that an incontestability
period required a valid contract, but under Delaware common law,
“contracts that offend public policy or harm the public are deemed void
193
as opposed to voidable.” Because no policy was ever effectuated, the
194
incontestability clause also never came into effect.
The second certified question was whether an individual may
procure a life insurance policy on his own life with no intent to provide
insurance protection to a party with an insurable interest and
195
immediately transfer the policy to a party with no insurable interest.
The court answered this question in the negative, effectively adding an
196
intent component to the validity of a life settlement deal. It is critical
to note, however, that the court stated that the intent of the insured is
197
Instead, the relevant inquiry is
“not the relevant inquiry.”
determining who procured the policy and whether that person possessed
198
an insurable interest. This addition helps to avoid a “triumph of form
199
over substance.”
To clarify, the court’s distinction focuses on preventing third parties
from using an insured as nothing more than a straw man to get around
the insurable interest requirement. Otherwise, a disinterested third
party who requests that an individual purchase a policy and then
immediately assign that same policy to the disinterested third party is
effectively the same as the disinterested third party acquiring a policy on
200
the insured’s life.
Indeed, the court nicely summarized its view by
Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1064.
190. Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1064.
191. Id. at 1065.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1067.
194. Id. at 1068.
195. Id. at 1064.
196. Id. at 1068, 1071.
197. Id. at 1076.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1071.
200. Id. at 1073–74. Such an arrangement violates the statutory framework that most
states have adopted. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing Delaware and
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stating that a validly issued life insurance policy “is assignable to
anyone, with or without an insurable interest, at any time. The key
distinction is that a third party cannot use the insured as a means . . . to
procure a policy that, when issued, would otherwise lack an insurable
201
interest.”
In other words, no straw man may be used and STOLI
transactions are not allowed. Importantly, traditional viatical and life
settlement transactions were not proscribed by the court’s decision.
The media coverage and industry responses to the Delaware
decisions further illustrate the distinction between STOLI transactions
and the traditional viatical and life settlement transactions. Shortly after
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions, the Wall Street Journal
202
published an article titled “Ruling Is Defeat for Death-Bet Investors.”
The article identified the rulings as significant because Delaware serves
as a home to many trust companies, and, as these cases illustrated, trusts
203
were being used by many to conceal an underlying STOLI transaction.
Counsel for the insurance company in Dawe described the decision as “a
204
great win for us.”
On the other hand, the article also quoted one
attorney who believed that the removal of the two-year incontestability
clause could make it very difficult for investors holding older policies to
205
receive payouts.
Interestingly, National Underwriter, an insurance industry
publication, started its article covering the Delaware decisions by stating
that “[t]he life settlement industry is welcoming a pair of recent
Delaware Supreme Court decisions, despite reports suggesting that the
206
The life settlement industry viewed the
decisions were a blow.”
decisions as a victory because the decisions referred to the existing life
207
settlement market as “perfectly legal” and “highly regulated.” In the
life settlement industry’s view, the decision confirmed the validity and
helped advance what the industry had been working to achieve: a
New York statutes related to third parties acquiring life insurance contracts on the lives of
others).
201. Id. at 1074.
202. Leslie Scism, Ruling Is Defeat for Death-Bet Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2011,
at C1.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Elizabeth Festa, Delaware Court Weighs in on Life Settlement Cases, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 18, 18.
207. Id. (quoting PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059, 1069
(Del. 2011)).
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legitimate secondary life settlement market without the presence of
208
STOLI policies.
2. New York
Delaware’s decisions on STOLI transactions and the secondary life
insurance market generally were at odds with New York case law until
209
the legislature brought the state’s law in line with Delaware. In New
England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Caruso, the issue was whether an
incontestability clause may bar the insurance company’s claim that the
policy is unenforceable because the original policyholder had sold the
210
policy to an individual with no insurable interest in the insured. The
Caruso court maintained an established New York rule that once the
incontestability period on an insurance policy passes, the insurer is
211
barred from asserting the policy owner’s lack of insurable interest.
The insurance company argued that paying the policyholder who has
no insurable interest in the insured would violate the New York
212
Insurance Law and be contrary to public policy. The court responded
to each argument in turn. First, the court stated that the New York
insurance law does not make contracts void for an individual lacking an
213
Second, the court found no public
insurable interest in the insured.
policy problem with the assignment of a valid life insurance policy by
the owner to a disinterested third party with no insurable interest in the
214
The court pointed out that an arrangement between the
insured.
owner and third party established a contract and that insufficient public
215
policy reasons existed to void a legal contract between the two parties.
The court went on to say:

208. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
209. Compare supra Part III.A.1, with New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535
N.E.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. 1989), and infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text (demonstrating
the difference between Delaware and New York judicial decisions before the New York
legislature acted to bring the New York rule regarding STOLI polices in line with what is
seen in other jurisdictions, like Delaware).
210. See Caruso, 535 N.E.2d at 271; see also Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Berck,
770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 732 (D. Del. 2011). In Berck the issue was whether Delaware law
permits an insurer to challenge the validity of a life insurance interest after the
incontestability period has lapsed. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
211. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d at 271.
212. Id. at 272.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 274.
215. Id. at 273–74.
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The statute requires that the policyholder have an insurable
interest in the life of decedent only at the time the contract was
made and to require evidence of insurable interest at this late
date could not only impose an undue burden on the policyholder
but also run counter to the policy considerations underlying
216
incontestability requirements.
The court did not believe that it would be appropriate to put the
investor who purchased the life insurance policy in a position that
required the investor to prove an insurable interest after the policy had
been in effect for longer than the incontestability period, especially with
the deceased insured being unable to corroborate the arrangement that
217
the parties had freely entered into.
In Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., New York’s highest court
218
confirmed what was said in Caruso. In Kramer, a New York attorney,
Arthur Kramer, took out several life insurance policies on his own life
and immediately assigned the beneficial interests of the policies to
219
Upon Kramer’s
individuals without an insurable interest in his life.
death, his wife, Alice Kramer, sought the insurance proceeds because
the individuals who held the beneficial interest lacked an insurable
220
Mrs. Kramer argued that this lack of insurable
interest in Kramer.
interest violated New York insurance law and would result in her
221
receiving the policy benefits.
After an interlocutory appeal was granted by the district court to the
Second Circuit, the Second Circuit certified the following question to
the New York Court of Appeals:
Does New York Insurance Law § 3205(b)(1) and (b)(2) prohibit
an insured from procuring a policy on his own life and
immediately transferring the policy to a person without an
insurable interest in the insured’s life, if the insured did not ever
intend to provide insurance protection for a person with an
222
insurable interest in the insured’s life?
In response to this question, the court of appeals held that New
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 274 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
See Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E.2d 535, 536–37 (N.Y. 2010).
See id. at 537. The aggregate value of the policies taken out was $56,200,000. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 536.
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York law allows a policy owner to immediately transfer a life insurance
policy on his own life to a third party with no insurable interest in the
insured’s life, “even where the policy was obtained for just such a
223
purpose.”
To support its decision, the Kramer majority looked at the language
224
of both section 3205(b)(1) and section 3205(b)(2). Section 3205(b)(1)
allows for any individual of lawful age to buy an insurance policy on his
own life for the benefit of any entity, and nothing in the insurance laws
prevent the individual from immediately transferring or assigning the
225
properly acquired policy.
On the other hand, section 3205(b)(2)
226
requires a third party to have an insurable interest in the insured. This
case clearly fell within 3205(b)(1) and, under the language of the
section, therefore did not require the assignee to have an insurable
227
interest in the insured party.
This decision by the court is consistent with both the legal and public
228
policy holdings from Caruso. Furthermore, it continues to build upon
the foundation from Grigsby by viewing life insurance policies as
property and refusing to question the appropriate assignment of a valid
229
life insurance policy to a party with no insurable interest. However,
the language used by the court, especially the allowance of immediate
transfers, leaves the door open for STOLI transactions.
Shortly after the decision in Kramer, a change to the New York
insurance law regarding life settlements took effect and prohibited
230
STOLI transactions. As a result, an individual is still not be prevented
223. Id. at 536–37.
224. Id. at 539.
225. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(1) (Consol. 2000) (“Any person of lawful age may on his
own initiative procure or effect a contract of insurance upon his own person for the benefit of
any person, firm, association or corporation. Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the
immediate transfer or assignment of a contract so procured or effectuated.”).
226. Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 539. Section 3205(b)(2) states: “No person shall procure or
cause to be procured, directly or by assignment or otherwise any contract of insurance upon
the person of another unless the benefits under such a contract are payable to the person
insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time when such a
contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured.” N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(2).
227. See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
228. See Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 540; see supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text
(discussing Caruso).
229. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1911).
230. See Life Settlements Act, ch. 499, 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1530, 1546 (codified as
amended at N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(c) (Consol. 2012)) (“No person shall directly or indirectly
engage in any act, practice or arrangement that constitutes stranger-originated life
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from immediately transferring his policy to another party, but the
assignor’s intent at the time of the policy’s creation would have to be for
the benefit of an insurable interest, and not for a STOLI transaction, for
231
the transfer to be valid.
B. Insurance Industry Regulation Efforts
The courts are not the only group that disapproves of STOLI
policies. Insurance industry organizations have also taken note of
STOLIs and published comprehensive model acts to provide regulation
to the secondary market, especially STOLI transactions. One group, the
232
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has created
233
the NAIC Viatical Settlements Model Act.
Similarly, the National
234
Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) has also adopted its
235
Both the NAIC and NCOIL intend
own life settlements model act.
236
for their model acts to serve as guides for state legislatures. Each will
be briefly discussed in turn.
The NAIC Model Act provides a wide range of rules, covering the
237
licensing of viatical settlement brokers and providers, prohibited
238
239
practices for market participants, fraud prevention, and remedies.
insurance.”).
231. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815(b) (“Stranger-originated life insurance arrangements do not
include lawful life settlement contracts as permitted by this article or those practices set forth
. . . [in] this article, . . . provided that such contracts or practices are not for the purpose of
evading regulation under this article.”).
232. The NAIC is composed of elected or appointed state officials who set regulatory
standards throughout the United States. About the NAIC, NAIC, http://www.naic.org/index_
about.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
233. The NAIC adopted the Viatical Settlements Act in December 1993 and amended
the model extensively in June 1998 and again in March 2001. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS
MODEL ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY § 17 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). Of particular
importance here, in June 2007 the Model was amended again to address STOLI policies. Id.
234. NCOIL is a group that defines itself as the “voice of state legislators in Washington
in the face of mounting federal initiatives to preempt state insurance regulation.” History and
Purpose, NCOIL, http://www.ncoil.org/ncoilinfo/about.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
235. See generally LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators
2007).
236. Kenneth W. Kingma & Stephan R. Leimberg, Deterring STOLI: Two New Model
Life Settlements Acts, EST. PLAN., July 2008, at 3, 3.
237. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 3 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009); see
also WINN, supra note 2, at 54–55 (summarizing the licensing and bonding requirements of
section 3 of the Viatical Settlements Model Act).
238. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §§ 11–12 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs
2009).
239. Id. §§ 14–15.
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While all states have different laws regarding life settlements, the Act
has, for the most part, been the basis for most state regulation of the
240
industry.
Aside from standardizing and regulating activity within the
secondary life insurance market, the NAIC Model Act also attempts to
241
To accomplish this goal, the NAIC Act
eradicate STOLI policies.
prohibits a policyholder from selling his policy in the secondary market
242
before five years have passed from the date the policy was issued. The
idea behind this policy is to allow for legitimate settlements to occur
while at the same time hampering the financial benefit that is associated
with STOLI policies by forcing the investor to employ prohibitively high
243
amounts of money. Interestingly, the NAIC Model Act does provide
exceptions to the five-year prohibition when certain events, such as
244
being diagnosed as terminally ill or having a spouse die, occur.
Much like the NAIC Model Act, the primary focus of the NCOIL
245
Model Act is to deter and prevent STOLI transactions. For example,
the NAIC act contains similar recommendations on advertising, such as
246
prohibiting the use of words that imply “free” or “no cost” insurance.
However, some notable differences do exist between the model acts.
Chief among these differences is the NCOIL act only placing a two-year
247
Importantly, the
waiting period on the settlement of new policies.
NCOIL act also possesses a broader scope. The NAIC act addresses the
most basic STOLI transaction: the acquisition of a policy at the request
248
of an investor for the sole purpose of selling that policy to the investor.
On the other hand, the NCOIL act attempts to cover “all manifestations
of STOLI, whether they involve direct settlements of life insurance, or

240. WINN, supra note 2, at 53.
241. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009);
WINN, supra note 2, at 58.
242. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009);
WINN, supra note 2, at 58.
243. See WINN, supra note 2, at 72.
244. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009)
(other examples include a divorce, retirement from full-time employment, or physical or
mental disability).
245. The NCOIL Model Act contains the following drafting note: “It is an essential
public policy objective to protect consumers against stranger-originated life insurance
(STOLI).” LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007).
246. Id. § 8.
247. Id. § 11(N).
248. Kingma & Leimberg, supra note 236, at 4–5.
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indirect sales of life insurance to investors through a sale of interest in
249
trust . . . or through other practices.”
This broader scope takes on
250
greater significance in light of recent cases.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: THE BENEFITS OF A MARKET-BASED
APPROACH
Properly created life settlements can offer a promising deal for two
251
competent parties.
Furthermore, because of the utility offered by
these products, there should be an incentive to cultivate a market to
allow people to benefit from the utility that the market presents.
However, at least two major roadblocks are holding back the life
settlement market: the questionable legality of life settlements and the
252
persistent fraud that has plagued the industry. When addressing these
dual roadblocks facing the maturation of the life settlement market, the
most prevalent issue in front of courts appears to be the lack of
253
Underlying these
insurable interests found in STOLI transactions.
concerns are the competing interests between allowing the life
settlement market to develop and protecting the interests of primary
insurance providers. The best way to balance these interests is to couple
a strict judicial adherence to incontestability clauses with a five-year
holding period on newly acquired life insurance policies.
This
arrangement would provide investors with certainty and make STOLI
transactions less financially attractive.
As National Underwriter pointed out, in some ways the life
254
settlement industry welcomed the Dawe and Schlanger decisions. The
industry has been trying to rid itself of STOLI policies for some time,

249. Id. at 4–5.
250. See generally, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059
(Del. 2011). For an example of trust schemes used by investors, see supra notes 185–88 and
accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. See Lazarus, supra note 79, at 273–74 (discussing the role that securitization could
play in the growth of the life settlement market and noting that some of the factors holding
back the move toward securitizing life settlements include legal concerns). This Comment
already discussed the questionable legality of life settlements and the fraud that is present in
the market. For a discussion on the legality issues facing the market, especially STOLI
policies, see supra Part III. For a discussion on fraud, see supra Part II.D.
253. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (explaining that the life settlements
are freely assignable at any time and that the problem comes in when there is no insurable
interest at the time the contract was made).
254. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.

12 KOUTNIK (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/13/2013 5:11 PM

LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET

947

and court decisions that help expose elaborate trust schemes as nothing
but enablers for STOLI policies help that cause. However, the
Delaware decision creates serious dangers to the life settlement
industry’s survival.
For this reason, the Delaware view on
incontestability clauses is both different and inferior to the approach
articulated in New York courts. Again, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that a life insurer may contest “the validity of a life insurance policy
based on a lack of insurable interest after the expiration of the two-year
255
New York, on the other hand, firmly
[in]contestability period.”
upheld the incontestability period, stating that “passage of the
incontestability period bars the insurer from thereafter asserting the
256
policyholder’s lack of an insurable interest.”
This distinction represents a significant difference between the states
because both the New York and Delaware legislatures have joined the
257
However, once STOLI
general trend away from STOLI policies.
policies are out of the picture, the vast majority of what remains are
legitimate life settlements. These life settlements, which were properly
acquired by an individual and later sold to an investor, may be
negatively impacted by the lack of an incontestability period. As
discussed earlier, the life insurance industry does not approve of the
258
With the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling, the
secondary market.
industry will be more emboldened to challenge life settlements after the
259
insured dies.
One of the main problems with lifting the incontestability period is
that it introduces a tremendous amount of uncertainty into the life
260
Not only will potential investors now view a life
settlement market.
settlement with even more suspicion, but existing investors, who
followed the rules set forth by the industry and state regulators, may
now be left susceptible to a legal challenge when attempting to receive
payment.
This problem is particularly concerning when it appears that
eliminating the incontestability provisions is unnecessary in light of the
simple options available to the insurance industry. It would not be
255. PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3d at 1064–65.
256. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. 1989).
257. See Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1074–75 (“After Kramer the New York legislature revised the
state’s insurance laws to prohibit STOLI transactions”).
258. See discussion supra Part II.E.
259. Scism, supra note 202.
260. See id.
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difficult for a life insurance application to include language that could
constrain, or even eliminate, the possibility that the policy be settled on
the secondary market. For example, an insurance company could
include in its application a provision that the insurance policy shall not
be assigned to an individual without an insurable interest in the insured
or that any assignment of the insurance policy must be approved by the
insurance company first. No valid reason exists to explain why these
policies cannot be included in a contract between two knowledgeable
actors.
The ability of the insurance market to function as a market makes
New York’s rule regarding a firm incontestability period the most
appropriate because it allows for the market to operate. Such an
approach seems to offer two possible ends. First, the industry locks out
the ability for people to settle life insurance policies on a secondary
market, and the life settlement market fades away. Alternatively, if
enough of the individuals acquiring life insurance demand policies that
can be settled on the secondary market, some insurers will undoubtedly
supply such policies.
Either result would provide certainty to investors because they
would know that after the incontestability period, the policy that they
purchase will pay out upon the death of the insured. Furthermore,
either result is preferable to the Delaware decision to look past the
incontestability provision. A strong incontestability period allows the
market, and not courts or other government entities, to determine the
261
In short, the life
fate of the secondary market for life insurance.
settlement market’s fate should be determined by its interaction with
the primary life insurance market and whether people seeking life
insurance from the primary market provide adequate demand for
policies that provide for the ability to later settle the policies on a
secondary market. A strong incontestability period helps to achieve this
goal by deterring STOLI transactions while providing repose to
investors who are able to provide meaningful value to the insured.
However, to effectively deter STOLI policies, the holding period for
new policies must be long enough to discourage investors from initiating
262
such policies. In this sense, state legislatures should codify the NAIC’s
261. This result should be welcomed, especially since, as the Supreme Court held in
Grigsby, life insurance policies are personal property. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156
(1911).
262. The McCarran-Ferguson Act makes insurance the exclusive domain of the states.
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, 33–34 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)
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qualified five-year prohibition on selling newly acquired life insurance
263
policies. This method is viewed by many as one of the best ways to
eliminate STOLI policies because it diminishes their economic
264
At the same time, bona fide settlements are still an
incentive.
265
available option to those who choose to engage in such a transaction.
Some argue that such a restriction on the sale of a life insurance
policy is “anti-consumer” because it prevents the owner of a life
266
While this argument
insurance policy from freely selling his policy.
has merits, there are reasons why it is unconvincing. First, without
effective eradication of STOLI policies, it seems possible that the life
settlement market will either cease to exist or never grow to its
potential. Since the five-year holding period provides an effective way
of eradicating STOLI policies, it will help create and preserve a market
that makes settling policies not only possible, but also legitimate.
Indeed, developing and preserving such a market is fundamentally proconsumer.
Second, exceptions can help alleviate any “anti-consumer” effects of
the five-year moratorium. For example, both the NAIC and NCOIL
model acts contains several “life events” that allow policyholders to sell
267
These exceptions include becoming terminally ill,
their policies.
268
becoming bankrupt or insolvent, and undergoing divorce.
Because
these exceptions are based on events that the policyholder either does
not control or that carry serious implications, the chance of people
attempting to engage in an event for the purpose of settling a policy
before the five-year period lapses seems unlikely. Still, the exceptions
prevent complete foreclosure on the ability of a consumer to settle a
policy when he is in a situation that requires urgent action.

(2006)); Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 297 (4th Cir. 2007). As a result, while
slow, piecemeal adoption through individual state legislatures, as opposed to federal action, is
necessary.
263. WINN, supra note 2, at 72.
264. Id. While it may still be practical for some investors to endure a five-year lag, it
seems unlikely that many investors would be willing to tie up significant amounts of capital
for five years in an asset in which the investor has no legal title for a deal.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.; VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009);
NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009).
268. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009);
NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009);
WINN, supra note 2, at 72.
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Insurance industry groups are already taking steps to eradicate
STOLI policies. The courts and state legislatures can help legitimize the
life settlement market by coupling a strict judicial understanding of a
policy’s incontestability clause with a modest regulation like the five269
year holding period.
V. CONCLUSION
At its core, the life settlement market provides an opportunity for a
life insurance policy to be transferred from the owner to an investor.
Driving this transfer is the mutual economic benefit available between
the cash settlement value and the value payable upon the death of the
insured.
To understand how to best promote the growth of this market, this
Comment began with a discussion of the life insurance industry before
detailing the origin of the life settlement market. This discussion was
followed by a description of the parties involved in the process of
settling a life insurance policy. Some examples of the problems facing
the secondary life insurance market, as well as the secondary market’s
interaction with the primary market, were then detailed.
Next, this Comment moved into case law by examining the view of
the courts on STOLI policies and explaining how the view of the courts
compares with the view of the life settlement industry. Decisions from
the highest courts in both New York and Delaware were then detailed
after a brief discussion of a few of the foundational Supreme Court
cases.
After considering the differences between the decisions and how
those differences could impact the growth and viability of the secondary
market, this Comment moved into the variety of efforts being used to
help rid the market of STOLI transactions. Among these efforts, the
model acts of the NAIC and NCOIL were highlighted.
Finally, this Comment recommended coupling a strict judicial
adherence to incontestability clauses with state codification of a fiveyear holding period on newly issued policies. This approach would help
stabilize the market by providing certainty to investors of validly settled

269. Such a market could help create products that are conducive to securitization,
which is a goal that many commentators have sought because of the independent agency
ratings and access to market exchanges that come along with the ability to securitize. See
generally Franklin L. Best, Jr., Securitization of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 911; Lazarus, supra note 79.
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policies while at the same time reducing the financial benefit offered by
STOLI transactions.
The end result will mean a stable market comprised of validly settled
life insurance policies. Such a market provides an opportunity for two
competent parties to achieve a mutual economic benefit.
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